Online Appendix for Elections, Ethnicity and Political Instability

28 September 2015

Contents

Introduction

This document shows the results of robustness tests and further exploration of the results shown in "Elections, Ethnicity and Political Instability". In each section the same tests shown in the main document are replicated with the specific changes made (i.e tests for elections at t+1, t, and t-1, with and without control variables). The tests discussed in this document include using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data for measures of ethnic fractionalization and polarization, dissaggregating election types into executive and legislative elections, dissagregating instability types and testing the hypotheses on alternative data for the dependent variable, in addition to using the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) to measure the presence of elections. We also test random effects probit models to account for the fact that observations within countries are probably not independent, show the regression tables displayed in the main document with robust standard errors clustered on the country and test that the results hold in non-democratic contexts.

Results Reported in the Main Document

The results below are those reported in the article. These results also include the regression tables, which were not included in the main text.

Table 1: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Base Model (shown in main text)

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−1.99***	−5.69***	−5.37***	−6.01***
	(0.15)	(0.69)	(0.72)	(0.72)
nld.election.l1	−0.25			−0.11
	(0.27)			(0.33)
ef	0.58***	0.16	0.03	0.03
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)
polarization	−0.11	0.12	0.13	0.16
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)
nld.election.l1:ef	−1.16**			−1.63***
	(0.51)			(0.59)
nld.election.l1:polarization	0.99*			1.03*
	(0.52)			(0.61)
nld.election.f1		−0.32		
		(0.34)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.37***	0.45***	0.45***
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.02**	0.02*
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.48***	0.34***	0.48***
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.12***	0.07**	0.12***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.04	0.09***	0.06*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
pr.l1		0.06	0.02	0.05
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.25		
		(0.22)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.51**		
		(0.21)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.31		
		(0.46)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		0.08		
		(0.54)		
nld.election			−0.46	
			(0.35)	
nld.earlylate			−0.12	
			(0.23)	
nld.suspend			0.19	
			(0.19)	
nld.election:ef			0.33	
			(0.42)	
nld.election:polarization			0.28	
			(0.49)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.32
				(0.28)
nld.suspend.l1				0.28
				(0.21)
AIC	1105.99	1011.17	1078.80	1000.78
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Impact of Elections on Probability of Violent Political Instability Across Simulated Ethnic Structures, Results in Main Article

First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability, Results in Main Article

Using the Ethnic Power Relations Data for Ethnic Structure

This section shows the results displayed in the main analysis, but when using the ethnic fractionalization measure from the Ethnic Power Relations data version 3.01 (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). We constructed the fractionalization measure in the same way as in Fearon's ethno-linguistic fractionalization data (i.e with the Herfindahl index) except using the groups and group population data from the Ethnic Power Relations Data. Using the EPR data in this way raises a number of additional issues as not all ethnic groups add up to 100% in the data. The results should be interpreted to reflect the fractionalization

and polarization scores of the ethnic groups that are 'politically' relevant. Countries where ethnicity is not relevant have been assigned fractionalization scores of "0" and polarization scores of "0".

Scatterplots, Elections, Ethnic Structure and Violent Political Instability, EPR data

Table 2: Elections and Violent Political Instability, EPR Data

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	-2.09^{***}	-5.26^{***}	-5.19^{***}	-5.61^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.66)	(0.65)	(0.69)
nld.election.l1	-0.17			-0.20
	(0.21)			(0.25)
epr.ef	0.54^{***}	0.10	0.01	-0.00
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
epr.pol	0.16	0.13	0.25	0.19
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
nld.election.l1:epr.ef	-0.65			-0.95^{*}
	(0.42)			(0.49)
nld.election.l1:epr.pol	0.52			0.76
	(0.43)			(0.50)
nld.election.f1		-0.29		
		(0.25)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.35^{***}	0.45^{***}	0.43^{***}
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.03^{***}	0.02^{**}
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.50^{***}	0.35^{***}	0.50^{***}
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.11^{***}	0.06^{**}	0.10^{***}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.04	0.09^{***}	0.06^{*}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nld.suspend.f1		0.46^{**}		
		(0.21)		
nld.earlylate.f1		0.20		
		(0.22)		
nld.election.f1:epr.ef		0.37		
		(0.38)		
nld.election.f1:epr.pol		-0.62		
		(0.46)		
nld.election			-0.05	
			(0.22)	
nld.suspend			0.19	
			(0.20)	
nld.earlylate			-0.13	
			(0.23)	
nld.election:epr.ef			0.14	
			(0.36)	
nld.election:epr.pol			-0.23	
			(0.41)	
nld.suspend.l1				0.24
				(0.21)
nld.earlylate.l1				-0.31
				(0.27)
AIC	1097.06	1007.10	1069.80	1006.79
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Simulated Cases Across the Spectrum of Ethnic Polarization and Fractionalization, EPR data

Impact of Elections on Probability of Violent Political Instability Across Simulated Ethnic Structures, EPR Data

First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability, EPR data

Disaggregating elections

This section tests our results, but disaggregates the elections into 'executive elections' and 'legislative elections' as defined in the NELDA codebook (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Executive elections

This section tests our results, but uses executive elections as the election-related independent variable as defined in the NELDA codebook (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Effects of Executive Elections Across Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

Table 3: Executive Elections and Violent Political Instability

|	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	-2.07^{***}	-5.54^{***}	-5.46^{***}	-5.81^{***}
	(0.13)	(0.75)	(0.66)	(0.73)
nld.exec.l1	-0.00			0.00
	(0.42)			(0.44)
ef	0.54^{***}	0.13	0.15	-0.10
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
polarization	-0.02	0.11	0.16	0.19
	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.25)
nld.exec.l1:ef	-1.36^*			-1.35^*
	(0.70)			(0.79)
nld.exec.l1:polarization	1.03			0.99
	(0.75)			(0.80)
nld.exec.f1		-0.01		
		(0.49)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.38^{***}	0.46^{***}	0.46^{***}
		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.02^{**}	0.02^*
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.48^{***}	0.36^{***}	0.47^{***}
		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.11^{***}	0.07^{**}	0.11^{***}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.05	0.10^{***}	0.06^*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
pr.l1		0.03	0.03	0.03
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1		-0.02		
		(0.20)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.21		
		(0.18)		
nld.exec.f1:ef		-0.26		
		(0.63)		
nld.exec.f1:polarization		-0.03		
		(0.76)		
nld.exec			-0.07	
			(0.49)	
nld.earlylate			-0.17	
			(0.22)	
nld.suspend			0.16	
			(0.18)	
nld.exec:ef			-0.35	
			(0.60)	
nld.exec:polarization			0.33	
			(0.71)	
nld.earlylate.l1				-0.52^*
				(0.27)
nld.suspend.l1				0.04
				(0.18)
AIC	1113.20	1015.12	1070.15	1016.04
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^*p < 0.1$

First Differences for Executive Elections and Violent Political Instability


Legislative Elections

This section tests the impact of legislative elections on the probability of violent political instability as defined in the NELDA data (Hyde and Marinov 2012).

Table 4: Legislative Elections and Violent Political Instability

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	-1.99^{***}	-5.56^{***}	-5.36^{***}	-6.09^{***}
	(0.15)	(0.77)	(0.66)	(0.75)
nld.legpar.l1	-0.29			-0.02
	(0.29)			(0.35)
ef	0.52^{***}	0.11	-0.00	-0.03
	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
polarization	-0.06	0.11	0.16	0.24
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
nld.legpar.l1:ef	-1.15^{*}			-1.73^{**}
	(0.60)			(0.69)
nld.legpar.l1:polarization	0.98^{*}			0.87
	(0.58)			(0.68)
nld.legpar.f1		-0.31		
		(0.36)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.37^{***}	0.46^{***}	0.46^{***}
		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.02^{**}	0.02^{**}
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.48^{***}	0.36^{***}	0.46^{***}
		(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.12^{***}	0.07^{**}	0.12^{***}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.05	0.09^{***}	0.06^{*}
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
pr.l1		0.04	0.03	0.04
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.13		
		(0.21)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.33^{*}		
		(0.18)		
nld.legpar.f1:ef		-0.14		
		(0.49)		
nld.legpar.f1:polarization		0.06		
		(0.57)		
nld.legpar			-0.37	
			(0.36)	
nld.earlylate			-0.19	
			(0.23)	
nld.suspend			0.12	
			(0.19)	
nld.legpar:ef			0.50	
			(0.43)	
nld.legpar:polarization			0.14	
			(0.50)	
nld.earlylate.l1				-0.42
				(0.28)
nld.suspend.l1				0.26
				(0.20)
AIC	1105.26	1007.88	1068.93	1004.90
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Effects of Legislative Elections Across Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

First Differences for Legislative Elections and Violent Political Instability

Marginal epr.effect on the Probability of Instability

Disaggregating Instability types

In this section we dissagregate 'serious political instability' into its four component forms and re-test the results on each. These four components are "revolutionary wars", "ethnic wars" and "adverse regime changes". For definitions of each form see (M. G. Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015). Note that we do not include a separate model for geno/politicide as there are no onsets of genocide or politicde in states with ethnic fractionalization scores over 0.75 and an election in the previous year. Although this would appear to support our contentions in the paper, it means that we cannot model the impact of an election in the previous year on the probability of geno/politicide in fractionalized states because, historically, there have

been no such occurances.

Revolutionary Wars

This section shows the results of our main regressions using the onset of revolutionary wars as the dependent varaible (M. G. Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015).Revolutionary wars are defined as "episodes of violent conflict between governments and politically organized groups (political challengers) that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region." (M. G. Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015, 5)

Table 5: Elections and Revolutionary Wars

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.51***	−5.41***	−5.69***	−6.17***
	(0.25)	(1.17)	(1.23)	(1.17)
nld.election.l1	−0.70			−0.31
	(0.60)			(0.69)
ef	0.61**	0.25	0.16	0.21
	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)
polarization	−0.20	−0.01	0.01	0.13
	(0.36)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.44)
nld.election.l1:ef	−0.44			−0.86
	(0.81)			(0.87)
nld.election.l1:polarization	1.12			1.11
	(0.87)			(0.97)
nld.election.f1		−0.01		
		(0.53)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.41***	0.48***	0.47***
		(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.15)
polity2.lag.1		−0.00	0.02	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.35	0.13	0.15
		(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.23)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.06	0.05	0.08
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nac.l1		0.11**	0.14***	0.14***
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
pr.l1		−0.00	−0.01	0.01
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.52*		
		(0.31)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.24		
		(0.34)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.76		
		(0.75)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		0.18		
		(0.89)		
nld.election			−0.47	
			(0.70)	
nld.suspend			0.72**	
			(0.33)	
nld.election:ef			−0.16	
			(0.80)	
nld.election:polarization			0.14	
			(0.98)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.21
				(0.44)
nld.suspend.l1				−0.28
				(0.42)
AIC	387.54	380.60	357.42	379.88
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Effects of Elections on Revolutionary War Onset in Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

First Differences for Revolutionary War Onset


Disaggregating Instability types - Ethnic Wars

This section shows the results of our main regressions using the onset of ethnic wars as the dependent varaible (M. G. Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015).Ethnic wars are defined as "episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status" (M. G. Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015, 6)

Table 6: Elections and Ethnic Wars

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	-2.28^{***}	-5.39^{***}	-4.99^{***}	-5.05^{***}
	(0.21)	(0.94)	(0.95)	(1.04)
nld.election.l1	-0.88^{*}			-0.64
	(0.48)			(0.56)
ef	0.35	0.22	0.18	0.13
	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
polarization	-0.12	0.12	0.08	0.08
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
nld.election.l1:ef	-3.76^{**}			-4.00^{**}
	(1.89)			(1.85)
nld.election.l1:polarization	3.48^{**}			3.23^{**}
	(1.39)			(1.38)
nld.election.f1		-1.57		
		(1.00)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.14	0.16	0.17
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
polity2.lag.1		-0.00	-0.01	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.24	0.28	0.35^{*}
		(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.15^{***}	0.12^{***}	0.12^{***}
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
nac.l1		0.03	0.07	0.05
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
pr.l1		0.01	0.05	0.01
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
nld.earlylate.f1		-0.18		
		(0.40)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.23		
		(0.29)		
nld.election.f1:ef		1.04		
		(0.88)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		1.04		
		(0.94)		
nld.election			-2.28	
			(1.93)	
nld.earlylate			-0.11	
			(0.43)	
nld.suspend			0.07	
			(0.35)	
nld.election:ef			2.71	
			(1.65)	
nld.election:polarization			0.33	
			(1.30)	
nld.earlylate.l1				-1.66
				(3.07)
nld.suspend.l1				0.46
				(0.32)
AIC	489.14	501.71	481.12	474.20
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Effects of Elections on Ethnic War Onset in Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

First Differences for Ethnic War Onset

## Disaggregating Instability types - Adverse Regime Changes

This section shows the results of our main regressions using the onset of adverse (non-democratic) regimes changes as the dependent varaible (M. G. Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2015).

Table 7: Adverse Regime Changes and Violent Political Instability

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.59***	−5.39***	−5.23***	−6.13***
	(0.24)	(0.94)	(1.24)	(1.06)
nld.election.l1	0.38			0.48
	(0.35)			(0.44)
ef	0.67**	0.22	0.24	0.10
	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.33)
polarization	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.22
	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.40)
nld.election.l1:ef	−0.84			−1.18*
	(0.58)			(0.71)
nld.election.l1:polarization	−0.06			−0.23
	(0.63)			(0.79)
nld.election.f1		−1.57	−0.25	
		(1.00)	(0.54)	
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.14	0.51***	0.61***
		(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.13)
polity2.lag.1		−0.00	0.04**	0.04***
		(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.24	0.79***	0.66***
		(0.20)	(0.18)	(0.16)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.15***	−0.01	0.02
		(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nac.l1		0.03	0.01	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)
pr.l1		0.01	0.03	0.02
		(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)
nld.earlylate.f1		−0.18	1.04***	
		(0.40)	(0.39)	
nld.suspend.f1		0.23	1.47***	
		(0.29)	(0.42)	
nld.election.f1:ef		1.04	−0.91	
		(0.88)	(0.86)	
nld.election.f1:polarization		1.04	−1.01	
		(0.94)	(1.02)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.26
				(0.36)
nld.suspend.l1				0.30
				(0.28)
AIC	573.50	501.71	438.95	495.57
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3710	3633

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Effects of Elections on Adverse Regime Change in Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

First Differences for Adverse Regime Changes

**Disaggregating instability types- UCDP Civil Wars.**

This section shows the impact of elections on UCDP civil wars in ethnically fractionalized states. The data come from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Monadic Conflict Onset and Incidence Data, version 4.13 (Themnér and Wallensteen 2014).

Table 8: Internal Armed Conflicts (UCDP/PRIO) and Violent Political Instability

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.17***	−5.84***	−5.52***	−6.01***
	(0.21)	(0.59)	(0.68)	(0.61)
nld.election.l1	−0.07			0.19
	(0.32)			(0.40)
ef	0.93***	0.71***	0.71***	0.69**
	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.30)
polarization	0.10	0.44	0.45	0.56*
	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)
nld.election.l1:ef	−0.74*			−1.09**
	(0.41)			(0.47)
nld.election.l1:polarization	0.55			0.27
	(0.47)			(0.57)
nld.election.f1		−0.44		
		(0.42)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.17**	0.18***	0.19**
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	−0.00	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.12	0.29**	0.13
		(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.19)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.19***	0.16***	0.18***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.03	0.09**	0.07*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
pr.l1		−0.04	0.07	0.01
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.26		
		(0.24)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.24		
		(0.17)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.27		
		(0.41)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		0.71		
		(0.50)		
nld.election			0.17	
			(0.34)	
nld.earlylate			0.25	
			(0.23)	
nld.suspend			−0.01	
			(0.20)	
nld.election:ef			−0.24	
			(0.42)	
nld.election:polarization			−0.16	
			(0.47)	
nld.earlylate.l1				0.12
				(0.22)
nld.suspend.l1				0.28
				(0.23)
AIC	1443.15	1470.74	1378.86	1325.28
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Effects of Elections on UCDP Intrastate / Internationalized Intrastate Conflict Onset in Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

First Differences for UCDP Intrastate / Internationalized Intrastate Onset

Disaggregating Instability types - Ulfelder and Valentino Mass Killing Episodes

This section shows the impact of the elections and ethnic fractionalization interaction on episodes of mass killing, as defined by Ulfelder and Valentino ((Ulfelder and Valentino 2008)). The data come from the 2014 update, which can be found at (https://github.com/ulfelder/cpg-statrisk-2014).

Table 9: Mass Killings and Violent Political Instability

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.62***	−4.47***	−5.33***	−5.51***
	(0.26)	(1.06)	(1.04)	(1.03)
nld.election.l1	0.17			0.44
	(0.40)			(0.46)
ef	0.83***	0.54	0.39	0.44
	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.33)
polarization	−0.12	0.12	0.14	0.13
	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.40)
nld.election.l1:ef	0.07			−0.08
	(0.50)			(0.54)
nld.election.l1:polarization	−0.33			−0.63
	(0.59)			(0.67)
nld.election.f1		−0.23		
		(0.57)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.21	0.37***	0.34***
		(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
polity2.lag.1		−0.01	0.00	−0.00
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.15	0.33	0.20
		(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.20)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.09*	0.08*	0.10**
		(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
nac.l1		0.02	0.07	0.05
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
pr.l1		−0.06	−0.02	0.03
		(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
nld.earlylate.f1		1.02***		
		(0.33)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.53		
		(0.34)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.89		
		(0.79)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		0.13		
		(0.91)		
nld.election			0.05	
			(0.52)	
nld.earlylate			−2.37	
			(104.37)	
nld.suspend			0.17	
			(0.28)	
nld.election:ef			−1.33*	
			(0.77)	
nld.election:polarization			1.04	
			(0.83)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.08
				(0.31)
nld.suspend.l1				0.27
				(0.25)
AIC	509.00	425.84	473.54	495.97
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Effects of Elections on Ulfelder and Valentino Mass Killing Onsets in Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

Warning: Removed 1 rows containing missing values (geom_errorbar).

First Differences for Ulfelder and Valentino Mass Killing Onsets

Disaggregating Instability Types - PITF Coups and Coup attempts.

This section shows the impact of the elections and ethnic fractionalization interaction on successful and attempted coups, as defined in the Political Instability Task Force's Coup d'etat Event Dataset, 2015 version ((M. Marshall and Marshall 2015)).

Table 10: Coups and Violent Political Instability

|	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−1.89***	−3.36***	−3.50***	−3.71***
	(0.14)	(0.58)	(0.60)	(0.56)
nld.election.l1	0.07			0.15
	(0.23)			(0.27)
ef	0.70***	0.20	0.14	0.09
	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)
polarization	−0.02	0.03	0.08	0.09
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
nld.election.l1:ef	−0.76**			−1.14***
	(0.37)			(0.41)
nld.election.l1:polarization	0.25			0.37
	(0.40)			(0.45)
nld.election.f1		−0.76**		
		(0.33)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.42***	0.47***	0.49***
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
polity2.lag.1		0.00	0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.49***	0.36***	0.34***
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		−0.00	−0.01	0.00
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		−0.04	−0.05	−0.01
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
pr.l1		−0.09**	−0.10**	−0.09**
		(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.51***		
		(0.19)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.97***		
		(0.17)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.45		
		(0.42)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		0.86*		
		(0.48)		
nld.election			−0.27	
			(0.30)	
nld.earlylate			0.27	
			(0.20)	
nld.suspend			0.23	
			(0.19)	
nld.election:ef			0.14	
			(0.37)	
nld.election:polarization			−0.06	
			(0.43)	
nld.earlylate.l1				0.40**
				(0.17)
nld.suspend.l1				0.28
				(0.18)
AIC	1580.10	1447.37	1448.92	1472.45
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Effects of Elections on Successful Coups and Coup attempts - PITF in Polarized and Fraction-alized Settings

First Differences for Successful Coups and Coup attempts - PITF

Marginal Effect on the Probability of Instability

Using the IAEP data for elections.

In this section we show the results of the interaction of ethnic fractionalization and elections on violent political instability, but in this test we use the data on elections from the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP; (Wig, Hegre, and Regan 2015)). The election variable reflects any election that was held in the country-year (or at t-1, or t+1, as in the main analysis).

Table 11: Elections (IAEP) and Violent Political Instability

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.08***	−5.33***	−5.68***	−6.19***
	(0.15)	(0.70)	(0.72)	(0.77)
election.l1	0.04			0.16
	(0.25)			(0.30)
ef	0.54***	0.18	0.02	−0.02
	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
polarization	0.05	0.21	0.24	0.33
	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)
election.l1:ef	−0.78*			−1.24**
	(0.46)			(0.55)
election.l1:polarization	0.28			0.38
	(0.48)			(0.58)
election.f1		−0.07		
		(0.31)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.36***	0.51***	0.48***
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)
polity2.lag.1		0.00	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.45***	0.33**	0.48***
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.10***	0.07**	0.12***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.06*	0.07**	0.06*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
pr.l1		0.03	0.04	0.02
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
electpost.f1		0.54**		
		(0.24)		
election.f1:ef		−0.50		
		(0.46)		
election.f1:polarization		0.15		
		(0.53)		
election			−0.41	
			(0.37)	
electpost			0.32	
			(0.28)	
election:ef			0.20	
			(0.44)	
election:polarization			0.17	
			(0.52)	
electpost.l1				0.29
				(0.28)
AIC	1153.18	1023.66	1005.39	1041.50
Num. obs.	3794	3794	3779	3794

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Effects of IAEP Elections Across Polarized and Fractionalized Settings

First Differences for IAEP Elections and Violent Political Instability

Marginal Effect on the Probability of Instability

Alternative Modelling Strategies

In this section we show the results of random effects probit regressions with random intercepts for each country, and the results using robust standard errors clustered on countries.

Random effects probit

Effects of Elections Across Polarized and Fractionalized Settings, Random Effects Probit Models

First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability, Random Effects Probit Models.

Coefficients with clustered robust standard errors.

The table below shows the results of our main regressions using robust standard errors clustered on countries (ccode). These data are not multiply imputed.

Table 12: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Country Clustered Robust SEs

	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−5.92***	−5.60***	−6.54***
	(0.75)	(0.72)	(0.89)
nld.election.f1	−0.38		
	(0.32)		
ef	0.17	0.03	0.01
	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.25)
polarization	0.05	0.09	0.13
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)
ln.wdi.imr.l1	0.39***	0.49***	0.51***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
polity2.lag.1	0.00	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1	0.45***	0.32**	0.42***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1	0.14***	0.08***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
nac.l1	0.02	0.08**	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
pr.l1	0.05	0.04	0.03
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1	0.30		
	(0.26)		
nld.suspend.f1	0.41		
	(0.25)		
nld.election.f1:ef	−0.41		
	(0.46)		
nld.election.f1:polarization	0.28		
	(0.45)		
nld.election		−0.46	
		(0.36)	
nld.earlylate		−0.08	
		(0.23)	
nld.suspend		0.07	
		(0.21)	
nld.election:ef		0.08	
		(0.50)	
nld.election:polarization		0.53	
		(0.53)	
nld.election.l1			0.03
			(0.25)
nld.earlylate.l1			−0.48
			(0.31)
nld.suspend.l1			0.22
			(0.21)
nld.election.l1:ef			−1.36***
			(0.53)
nld.election.l1:polarization			0.60
			(0.52)
AIC	881.89	937.69	851.77
BIC	985.04	1041.19	954.85
Log Likelihood	-423.95	-451.84	-408.89
Deviance	847.89	903.69	817.77
Num. obs.	3190	3256	3176

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Impact of Elections on Instability in Non-democratic States

This replicates the models in the main analysis, but in the sample of non-democratic states. Non-democratic states are defined here as those scoring less than 6 on the polity index (ranging from -10 to 10).

Impact of Elections on Instability in Non-democratic States Across Simulated Ethnic Structures.

Table 13: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Non-Democracies

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−1.85***	−5.99***	−5.47***	−5.89***
	(0.17)	(0.87)	(0.83)	(0.85)
nld.election.l1	−0.52			−0.32
	(0.40)			(0.44)
ef	0.40*	−0.04	−0.02	−0.11
	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.26)
polarization	−0.16	0.20	0.22	0.22
	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
nld.election.l1:ef	−1.67**			−1.65**
	(0.73)			(0.80)
nld.election.l1:polarization	1.81**			1.37*
	(0.71)			(0.76)
nld.election.f1		−0.46		
		(0.41)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.37***	0.34***	0.42***
		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
polity2.lag.1		0.04**	0.05***	0.05***
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.25	0.17	0.19
		(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.14***	0.11***	0.12***
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
nac.l1		0.04	0.08**	0.07**
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
pr.l1		0.07	0.02	0.07
		(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.46*		
		(0.26)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.46*		
		(0.24)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.22		
		(0.52)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		0.15		
		(0.60)		
nld.election			−0.59	
			(0.45)	
nld.earlylate			−0.20	
			(0.30)	
nld.suspend			0.18	
			(0.23)	
nld.election:ef			0.48	
			(0.50)	
nld.election:polarization			0.27	
			(0.57)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.49
				(0.44)
nld.suspend.l1				0.03
				(0.29)
AIC	808.36	788.26	816.87	748.58
Num. obs.	2468	2536	2500	2468

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability, Non-democratic states

Marginal Effect on the Probability of Instability

Test with alternative measure of independent variable

This section tests hypothesis 1 with a dichotomous measure of a 'multipolar' ethnic demography. The variable "Multipolar" was constructed in the following way. States where the largest ethnic group was more than 50% of the population were coded 'hegemonic'. States where the largest group was less than 49% of the population and the second largest group was more than 30% were coded as 'bipolar' and states that were neither hegemonic nor bipolar were coded as multipolar.

Table 14: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Alternative Independent Variable

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−1.82***	−5.47***	−5.36***	−6.17***
	(0.06)	(0.67)	(0.64)	(0.67)
nld.election.l1	−0.11			−0.10
	(0.10)			(0.14)
frac.f	0.24**	0.03	−0.01	−0.02
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
nld.election.l1:frac.f	−0.56**			−0.76***
	(0.26)			(0.29)
nld.election.f1		−0.42***		
		(0.16)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.39***	0.47***	0.49***
		(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.02***	0.02*
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.47***	0.37***	0.47***
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.11***	0.07**	0.12***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.05	0.09***	0.05
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
pr.l1		0.05	0.03	0.06
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.25		
		(0.22)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.50**		
		(0.21)		
nld.election.f1:frac.f		−0.02		
		(0.22)		
nld.election			−0.14	
			(0.14)	
nld.earlylate			−0.12	
			(0.23)	
nld.suspend			0.21	
			(0.19)	
nld.election:frac.f			0.12	
			(0.20)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.32
				(0.28)
nld.suspend.l1				0.25
				(0.21)
AIC	1106.67	1009.51	1068.76	986.49
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Effects of Election Across Multipolar and Non-Multipolar Ethnic Structures

First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability

Considering Influential Observations

Our fractionalization variable is cross sectional, and it may be a concern that one case is heavily influencing our results. To asses the extent to which this was the case we ran the base regression with an election at t-1 169 times removing one country from the sample each time, then replacing it. We stored the coefficients and p-values for each regression and the distributions obtained are shown below. As the figure suggests there is no scenario when a country is removed that also results in the p-value for our interaction term moving above 0.05 or the coefficient moving below -1.0. This suggests that our results are not the product of any single country influencing the results.

Distribution of coefficients and p-values with single countries removed

## Results without polarization included

This section shows our results when we do not include the polarization and elections interaction as shown in the main results. The first order polarization term is also excluded as a variable in the model. The only interaction term in the models below is the fractionalization and elections interaction.

Table 15: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Polarization Removed

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.04***	−5.56***	−5.22***	−5.74***
	(0.11)	(0.65)	(0.69)	(0.69)
nld.election.l1	0.07			0.20
	(0.20)			(0.23)
ef	0.55***	0.20	0.07	0.09
	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
nld.election.l1:ef	−0.58			−0.93**
	(0.35)			(0.40)
nld.election.f1		−0.30		
		(0.25)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.36***	0.44***	0.43***
		(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.02**	0.02*
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.49***	0.36***	0.50***
		(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.12***	0.07**	0.11***
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
nac.l1		0.05	0.09***	0.07*
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
pr.l1		0.06	0.03	0.06
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.25		
		(0.22)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.51**		
		(0.21)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.26		
		(0.40)		
nld.election			−0.32	
			(0.25)	
nld.earlylate			−0.12	
			(0.23)	
nld.suspend			0.20	
			(0.19)	
nld.election:ef			0.38	
			(0.38)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.36
				(0.28)
nld.suspend.l1				0.27
				(0.21)
AIC	1105.94	1007.51	1075.88	1001.93
Num. obs.	3633	3710	3713	3633

***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$

Impact of Elections on Probability of Violent Political Instability Across Simulated Ethnic Structures, No Polarization

First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability, No Polarization

Results across subsets of the data

In this section we subset the data into 'fractionalized', 'polarized' and 'homogenous' states and run a simplified model, due to the lower number of observations. We include variables that have significant and predicted effects in the expected direction on instability in the base model. These controls are the most likely to represent (and be contorlling for) genuine alternative explanations. These variables are: log population, log infant mortality rate, neighboring countries in conflict, polity2 score, partial democracy with factions. We also include country-fixed effects in these models so that we are controlling out country-level factors and

comparing election and non-election periods within the same country.

Fractionalized States

Table 16: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Fractionalized States (Country Fixed Effects)

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−5.89	−8.99	−11.29	−21.19
	(500.30)	(5.70)	(464.99)	(638.36)
nld.election.l1	−0.62**			−0.93***
	(0.25)			(0.30)
nld.election.f1		−0.25		
		(0.21)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.97*	0.84**	1.63***
		(0.52)	(0.40)	(0.55)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.03	0.03
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.94***	0.49	1.03***
		(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.35)
stabyrs		0.03	0.02	0.14*
		(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.08)
stabyrs.2		−0.00	−0.00	−0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
stabyrs.3		0.00	0.00	0.00**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.15	0.02	0.38
		(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.39)
nac.l1		0.02	−0.00	−0.08
		(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.11)
nld.election			0.11	
			(0.19)	
AIC	372.02	381.15	409.97	326.17
Num. obs.	865	878	850	865

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Polarized States

Table 17: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Polarized States (Country Fixed Effects)

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	-1.78^{***}	-10.49	-10.54	-10.39
	(0.07)	(691.18)	(639.97)	(663.71)
nld.election.l1	-0.11			-0.19
	(0.13)			(0.18)
nld.election.f1		-0.33^{*}		
		(0.19)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.38^{*}	0.46^{**}	0.45
		(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.32)
polity2.lag.1		0.05^{**}	0.07^{***}	0.07^{***}
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
part.dem.fac.l1		-0.06	-0.02	-0.03
		(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.25)
stabyrs		0.07	0.12^{**}	0.08^{*}
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
stabyrs.2		-0.00	-0.01^{**}	-0.01^{**}
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
stabyrs.3		0.00	0.00^{**}	0.00^{**}
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.06	0.01	0.01
		(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.39)
nac.l1		0.01	0.07	0.08
		(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
nld.election			0.06	
			(0.16)	
AIC	515.89	524.49	573.04	556.14
Num. obs.	1704	1741	1761	1704

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Homogenous States

Table 18: Elections and Violent Political Instability, Homogenous States (Country Fixed Effects)

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−1.98***	−24.04	−12.01	−9.48
	(0.10)	(839.56)	(819.14)	(766.86)
nld.election.l1	−0.07			−0.16
	(0.18)			(0.33)
nld.election.f1		−0.24		
		(0.32)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.93*	0.89*	1.04**
		(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.41)
polity2.lag.1		−0.00	0.03	0.04
		(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.89	0.45	0.65
		(0.55)	(0.49)	(0.54)
stabyrs		−0.03	−0.07	−0.14
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
stabyrs.2		0.00	0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
stabyrs.3		0.00	−0.00	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.69	0.11	−0.10
		(0.84)	(0.69)	(0.49)
nac.l1		0.21	0.22	0.31*
		(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)
nld.election			−0.47	
			(0.34)	
AIC	233.30	246.14	242.82	237.30
Num. obs.	1064	1091	1102	1064

$^{***}p < 0.01$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{*}p < 0.1$

Ethnic wars in the EPR dataset

Table 19: Elections and Ethnic Civil War (EPR Dependent Variable)

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.71***	−6.24***	−5.63***	−7.27***
	(0.27)	(0.98)	(0.96)	(1.04)
nld.election.l1	0.13			0.28
	(0.42)			(0.53)
ef	0.93***	0.76**	0.82**	0.82**
	(0.30)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.37)
polarization	0.11	0.44	0.47	0.59
	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.41)
nld.election.l1:ef	−0.97			−1.24*
	(0.66)			(0.74)
nld.election.l1:polarization	0.35			0.07
	(0.71)			(0.81)
nld.election.f1		−1.69		
		(1.08)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.19*	0.16*	0.22**
		(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
polity2.lag.1		0.01	0.00	0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.05	0.16	0.02
		(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)
peaceyears		−0.05*	−0.04*	−0.06**
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
peaceyears.2		0.00	0.00	0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
peaceyears.3		−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.17***	0.13***	0.21***
		(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
nac.l1		−0.01	0.10**	0.03
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
pr.l1		−0.00	0.03	−0.00
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.51*		
		(0.29)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.70***		
		(0.27)		
nld.election.f1:ef		0.43		
		(0.91)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		1.47		
		(0.96)		
nld.election			0.06	
			(0.55)	
nld.earlylate			0.25	
			(0.27)	
nld.suspend			0.21	
			(0.28)	
nld.election:ef			−0.07	
			(0.58)	
nld.election:polarization			−0.24	
			(0.67)	
nld.earlylate.l1				0.39
				(0.29)
nld.suspend.l1		60		0.06
				(0.36)
AIC	493.37	492.89	517.21	471.52
Num. obs.	3160	3227	3252	3160

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Impact of Elections on Probability of Violent Political Instability Across Simulated Ethnic Structures, EPR Ethnic Armed Conflict

**First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability, EPR Ethnic Armed Conflict**

Marginal Effect on the Probability of Instability

Non-ethnic wars in the EPR dataset

Table 20: Elections and Non-Ethnic Civil War Onset (EPR Data for DV)

	No Controls, Election t-1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t-1
(Intercept)	−2.58***	−4.77***	−4.42***	−5.27***
	(0.26)	(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.98)
nld.election.l1	−0.05			0.10
	(0.42)			(0.47)
ef	0.90***	0.51	0.56*	0.49
	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.34)
polarization	−0.13	0.10	−0.07	0.04
	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)
nld.election.l1:ef	−1.20*			−1.44*
	(0.69)			(0.74)
nld.election.l1:polarization	0.97			0.89
	(0.72)			(0.79)
nld.election.f1		−0.40		
		(0.53)		
ln.wdi.imr.l1		0.22**	0.24**	0.28**
		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)
polity2.lag.1		0.02*	0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
part.dem.fac.l1		0.12	0.41**	0.30
		(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
peaceyears		−0.02	−0.07**	−0.04
		(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
peaceyears.2		0.00	0.00**	0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
peaceyears.3		−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ln.wdi.pop.l1		0.09**	0.07*	0.10**
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
nac.l1		−0.00	−0.02	−0.02
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
pr.l1		−0.09	0.03	0.01
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
nld.earlylate.f1		0.25		
		(0.24)		
nld.suspend.f1		0.01		
		(0.27)		
nld.election.f1:ef		−0.54		
		(0.62)		
nld.election.f1:polarization		1.12		
		(0.70)		
nld.election			0.22	
			(0.41)	
nld.earlylate			0.32	
			(0.23)	
nld.suspend			−0.38	
			(0.40)	
nld.election:ef			−0.88	
			(0.62)	
nld.election:polarization			0.38	
			(0.69)	
nld.earlylate.l1				−0.13
				(0.32)
nld.suspend.l1				0.17
				(0.29)
AIC	481.04	516.16	510.25	472.07
Num. obs.	3204	3285	3282	3204

66

***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

Impact of Elections on Probability of Violent Political Instability Across Simulated Ethnic Structures, Non-Ethnic Armed Conflicts (EPR)

**First Differences for Elections and Violent Political Instability, Non-Ethnic Armed Conflicts (EPR)**

	No Controls, Election t−1	Election t+1	Election t	Election t−1

Marginal Effect on the Probability of Instability

**Square of the EF index instead of the polarization measure**

NULL

Categorical indicators of low, medium and high fractionalization

Low fractionalization is ef $<=0.33$, medium is ef >0.33 & ef <0.66, high is ef $>=0.66$

NULL

Summary of Robustness Tests

Marginal Effect of Election in Fractionalized State on the Probability of Instability

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