

To Arms or to the Streets?

Explaining Violent and Nonviolent Rebellion by Religious Groups in
Authoritarian states

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Abstract

Why do some religious groups resist authoritarian states with nonviolent means, whereas others take up arms or remain passive? In this paper we explore the relationship between state inclusion and discrimination of religious groups and their propensity to rebel with violent or nonviolent means. We argue that the relationship is non-linear. Discrimination can motivate violent groups to emerge from within religious traditions while inclusion tempers these motivations. State inclusion increases the feasibility of nonviolent tactics up to a point where the fusion of religious and state institutions makes the status quo so attractive as to make rebellion unlikely. Thus we expect an ‘inverted U’ relationship between state inclusion and the probability of nonviolent contention, and a positive relationship between state discrimination and violent conflict. Analyzing a unique dataset of all religious groups in states from 1990-2013 and new data on the participation of religious groups in violent or nonviolent campaigns, our analysis largely supports this argument. State discrimination is correlated with violent conflict and inclusion correlated with nonviolent conflict in general, but we find that the relationship between inclusion and violent conflict is parabolic for nonviolent forms of rebellion.

Introduction

Why do some religious groups resist authoritarian states with nonviolent action, whereas others take up arms or remain passive? We know from previous research that religious actors are commonly at the forefront of unarmed uprisings and that many popular democratization movements have had a religious component (Toft et al. 2011).¹ Illustrative examples include the Philippines in 1986 and Myanmar in 2008, where Catholic nuns and clergy, and Buddhist monks, played key roles in the nonviolent uprisings against their undemocratic regimes. In the study of *armed* conflicts, religious incompatibilities appear to increase the durability conflicts (Horowitz 2009) as well as their intensity (Nordås 2010; Pearce 2005; Toft 2006, 2007), and lower the chances for peaceful settlement (Hassner 2003, 2009; Svensson 2007, (2012). Moreover, the proportion of all armed conflicts that involve some religious incompatibility is increasing over time (Svensson 2013; Gleditsch and Rudolfsen 2016). Several contemporary examples – jihadist groups in the on-going civil war in Syria, Buddhist militancy against Muslim minorities in Myanmar, and violent clashes between predominately Christian and Muslim segments of the population in the Central African Republic – are just a few illustrating the negative effect that religious identities can have when embroiled in armed contestations. This contrast between the constructive and destructive roles that religiously defined groups have played reflects what Appelby (1999, see also Nepstad 2004) calls, ‘the ambivalence of the scared’ or what Philpott (2007) has labelled the ‘political ambivalence of religion’.

Researchers have sought to explain the factors that push religious groups towards these constructive or destructive roles, although most research has examined one in isolation from the other, with the focus heavily on the destructive side (Basedau et al 2016; Finke and Harris 2012; Akaba and Taydas 2011; Akbaba and Fox 2011, Asal et al 2015; although see Vullers et al 2015 for a recent exception). Recent studies have turned to the impact of state discrimination of religious minorities on the likelihood of violent confrontation, with mixed results. Basedau et al (2015) find that although discrimination increases perceived grievances, these grievances are not connected to increased chances of violent conflict, while Akaba and Taydas (2011) find that discrimination does increase the likelihood of violent conflict. These

¹ By nonviolent campaigns we here popular based predominately nonviolent uprisings with aspirations relating to the domestic government, territorial issues, or end of foreign occupation (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Smaller campaigns on other issues are therefore not included in this analysis.

studies are part of a broader movement towards understanding the effect of discrimination on group level decisions to participate in collective dissent using group level data, especially for ethnic groups (Bormann et al 2015), with the general finding that state discrimination increases the probability of those groups rebelling violently (Cederman et al 2013; Cederman et al 2010). This shift towards the group level is welcome, but there are few studies that examine group level decisions to rebel nonviolently (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), and no quantitative studies that we are aware of that systematically examine how state *inclusion* affects the propensity for rebellion. Cunningham (2013) and Asal et al (2013) do examine drivers of group level choices between violent and nonviolent tactics, but their focus is on ethno-political organizations (in the Middle East) and secessionist groups which likely excludes the vast majority of religious groups. Probably the closest to our interests is Philpott (2007) and Toft et al (2012) who argue, and show with qualitative evidence, that the most peaceful scenario exists when the state and religious groups are consensually differentiated into separate realms of authority, and that violent challenges are most likely in situations of conflictual integration (such as in some communist states) or consensual integration (i.e. religious states) where minorities are likely to rebel. We draw from the theoretical insights of these studies, and provide a new test of some of these hypotheses on a global dataset. Combined, we suggest that to more fully understand the puzzle of the ambivalence of the sacred, attention should be paid to the effects of state discrimination *and* state inclusion at the group level on the likelihood that religious groups rebel with violent *or* nonviolent means.

We examine how patterns of state inclusion and exclusion influence the propensity of religious groups to rebel violently or nonviolently in authoritarian states with new data on the participation of religious groups in violent and nonviolent conflict based the Major Episodes of Contention data (MEC; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2016) as well as new data on state-favoritism that is disaggregated to the religious group level. Our main predictions are that state inclusion increases the probability of nonviolent forms of contention occurring, compared to ‘neutral’ relations with the state, while state discrimination increases the probability of participation in violent conflict. We also argue that while increasingly exclusive forms of state *inclusion* should not increase the propensity of religious groups to rebel violently, they should make it less likely that these groups rebel nonviolently, as the value of the status quo increases. Thus, we expect a parabolic relationship between increasing state favoritism and nonviolent forms of conflict. Our results largely bear out these expectations. Violent rebellion seems to be a function of state discrimination and nonviolent rebellions are

more likely to emerge from favored groups in general. We also observe a declining effect of favoritism on nonviolent conflict as the intensity of state favoritism reaches the extremes.

Theory

In this section we link state inclusion and discrimination to the onset of violent or nonviolent rebellion by religious groups. Underpinning our argument is a basic strategic model whereby groups consider how effective their tactical choices will be in realizing the outcomes that they want, how valuable winning is to the status quo, and then reason back to select whether or not to rebel, and how, in the first place. Our main addition is to connect patterns of state inclusion and discrimination to the perceived effectiveness of violent and nonviolent tactics, and the value of the status quo. We derive three main hypotheses discussed in more detail below: – (1) discrimination is positively correlated with the onset of violent rebellion, (2) that state favoritism in general increases the probability of nonviolent rebellion and (3) groups that are favored by the government through the fusion of religious and political institutions (such as in Iran) are unlikely to see rebellion by favored religious groups. The following section proceeds by outlining our main concepts and their relations, first by discussing the concepts of violent and nonviolent conflict, followed by a discussion of authoritarian states and patterns of religious exclusion and inclusion and how they interact to produce different patterns of rebellion by religious groups.

Violent and Nonviolent Tactics

Recent research has argued that violent and nonviolent tactics have different resource mobilization demands arising from the different ways in which they apply coercion (Dahl et al 2015; Butcher and Svensson 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). While violent insurgency coerces with the use of direct, physical attacks to destroy soldiers, infrastructure or public confidence, nonviolent tactics, such as demonstrations and strikes, coerce by inducing or signaling non-compliance from sectors important to the functioning of the regime (Sharp 2005; DeNardo 1995; Lohmann 1995; Schock 2005). Effective nonviolence depends upon the ability mobilize large numbers of people from parts of society important to the functioning of government into non-compliance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Doing so enables the movement to impose costs upon the government in the present, signal high costs for maintaining the status quo into the future, and increases the ability to survive repression. If

key ‘pillars’ of the regime defect, or shirk, then the leader or regime may fall. Schock (2005) calls the ability to impose present costs and signal future costs ‘leverage’ and the ability to survive repression ‘resilience’ and both are key pillars of ‘capability’ in nonviolent conflict. The conditions that make violent tactics feasible are different, and depend more on the ability to attract weapons and finance, maintain secrecy and find sanctuary from government reprisals (Cunningham 2013).

We expect that factors leading social groups to believe that they could effectively utilize nonviolent (or violent) tactics for coercion will do so. That is, changes that lead social groups to a belief that have the capacity for mass mobilization such that they could (1) effectively impose present costs on the government, (2) signal that it will be more ‘expensive’ for the government to maintain the status quo in the future, and (3) survive repression should become increasingly likely to rebel with nonviolent means, other things being equal. Factors that lead groups to believe that they could wage an effective violent campaign should increase the likelihood that these groups select violent tactics, other things being equal. Put differently, changes that make it more likely that social groups will believe they can attract weapons and finance and mobilize a highly-motivated core of individuals willing to use violence against the regime, should also increase the likelihood that these tactics are selected. The value of rebellion in general should also be a function of how valuable the status quo is, as there is less to gain from victory, given the costs of either option.² Importantly, some factors may increase the feasibility of nonviolent tactics without decreasing the feasibility of violent tactics, and vice versa, something we argue in relation to state inclusion and exclusion below.

Authoritarian states

Our universe of cases consists of states where the head of state cannot be replaced by elections that empower the majority of citizens. This minimalist definition of autocracy is consistent with that found in Gandhi (2008), Svoboda (2012) and Magaloni et al (2013). Authoritarian states are our focus because the effectiveness of civil resistance is determined by different processes in autocracy and democracy. Peaceful protests can act as a signal of

² Of course, all of these options depend on rebellion not being prohibitively costly, and assuming that the rate at which state inclusion generates capability in nonviolent conflict being greater than the rate at which inclusion increases the attractiveness of the status quo. How different this rate needs to be will depend on how costly rebellion is.

potential punishment at the ballot box in democratic states. By definition, policies cannot be changed by elections in autocracies, so, in general, dissidents must make the status quo more costly for the government by inducing noncompliance and defection from important ‘pillars’ of the regime (Sharp 2005). Authoritarian states also face fundamental commitment problems and information problems that arise from the non-competitiveness of executive recruitment and the incentives to conceal preferences (Svolik 2012). Without regular means of revising the authoritarian bargain, sub-state groups cannot trust that present promises will be adhered to in the future. These commitment and information problems create the general conditions for rebellion in authoritarian states.

State inclusion and discrimination

Of course, dictators are aware of this and use institutions to constrain themselves and overcome these commitment problems and obtain information on supporters and potential rivals (Cox 2008). As Gandhi (2008) has argued, political parties and illiberal elections are two ways in which dictators constrain their behavior and overcome problems of credible communication. Religious groups can (and would appear to commonly) present a particular problem for authoritarian regimes. Religious groups often command a moral legitimacy and authority that the state may aspire to, but cannot claim. They have the ability to overcome intense collective action problems and inspire acts of heroic risk-taking and sacrifice that may destabilize the regime. If these religious groups are large, and influence the moral persuasions of a broad section of society then these groups also have the potential to mobilize a significant number of people into collective dissent, and may also be very hard for the regime to use violent repression against without sparking further backlash. If the regime cannot credibly promise to these religious groups that their preferences will be translated into policy into the future, then this can create the conditions whereby religious groups have the means and motive to rebel against government actors. Unsurprisingly, authoritarian states also design specific institutions to manage relations with religious groups. These can range from overt discrimination and persecution through to forms of government subsidy and at the extreme, systematic and regular access to decision-making power, even decision making power over how the executive will be composed, as is the case in Iran (Fox 2008; deJuan 2008). Iran provides examples of the two extremes where Bahais have been severely persecuted by the Iranian state while the council of (Shia) clerics has effective veto power on legislation. With perfect information, states should offer sub-state groups with some potential for rebellion a

package combining the threat of repression, and potentially, concessions that are just enough to keep them indifferent between dissent and compliance although information and commitment problems limit the ability to realize this in practice (Walter 2009; Svobik 2012; Gandhi 2008). We can thus conceptualize the relationship between individual religious groups and the state as falling on a spectrum from extreme repression and discrimination to neutrality, to moderate and then high levels of favoritism. In the following section we argue that different patterns of state favoritism and discrimination create incentives for religious groups to rebel with either violent or nonviolent tactics, or to stay passive.

Discrimination and Violent Conflict

Religious groups that are actively discriminated against by the state have clear motives for rebellion. The status quo is poor, and a successful rebellion would carry significant benefits (Basedau et al 2015; Akbaba and Taydas 2011). Excluded groups, however, are limited in their tactical choices. Non-cooperation is unlikely to generate significant governance costs for the regime and the regime may calculate that it can effectively and violently repress any unarmed movement. Other things being equal, institutional discrimination by the state renders nonviolent tactics an ineffective form of coercion.³ State exclusion, however, does not necessarily decrease the utility of violent tactics, and, as Cederman et al (2013) have shown, may even make violent tactics more feasible by providing a coherent narrative of injustice around which to mobilize. Exclusion and discrimination may also reduce the ability of the government to monitor preparations for rebellion, or obtain information from civilians. There is developing evidence that group level ethnic discrimination and exclusion increases the probability of violent rebellion (Cederman, et al 2010). We expect the relationship to be the same for religious groups, as has been observed elsewhere, although in relation only to minorities (Akbaba and Taydas 2011). Thus, our first hypothesis is as follows:

H1 – Religious groups that are discriminated against by the state are more likely to see onsets of violent conflict.

Inclusion and Nonviolent Conflict

³ It may be the case that states discriminate against these groups because they lack mobilization potential.

State inclusion, or state favoritism, can create tactical advantages in nonviolent forms of conflict. Recent research has suggested that the feasibility of nonviolent tactics is partly a function of overlapping social networks across civil society groups and across civil society groups and the state. Connections across civil society enable dissidents to overcome collective action problems and connections with the state increase the costs of repression and potentially enable the movement to induce defections from the regime (Nepstad 2011; Thurber 2012; Butcher and Svensson 2016). Inclusion enmeshes the social networks of religious groups and the state and potentially enables the religious group to expand their social networks. Inclusion affords religious groups a level of state sanctioned moral legitimacy that can, in theory, be withdrawn from the state in periods of conflict (Henne 2012:754). Moreover, the moral legitimacy and enmeshment between the identity of the state and the religious group may make protests difficult to repress violently when members of this groups participate without also provoking backlash from other religious supporters. The closer this connection, the more likely that members of the regime, especially the armed forces, will find themselves confronted with members of a moral elite in dissent. Repression may carry increased symbolism and personal religious costs in this circumstance, as was the case when the armed forces of the Marcos regime faced off against protesters led by Catholic nuns in Manila in 1986. Repression of nonviolent tactics for favored groups, in this case may be more costly for the regime than repression of unfavoured groups.

The participation of a state-favored group also sends a strong signal that preferences have shifted against the regime. As DeNardo (1995) argues, the effectiveness of protest depends in part by signaling the preferences of *non-participants* through the symbolism constructed by participants. Thus, dissent by a favored group likely sends a strong signal that median attitudes towards the government have shifted towards the opposition. The implication is that ‘buying off’ these groups in the future will be more costly for the regime. State favoritism also, usually, affords a certain level of freedom of organization for favored religious groups (often at the expense of other groups). These groups may create geographically expansive and extensive networks and institutions that link religious believers across the country. These institutions may be formally designed for religious observance or teaching and education, but they also provide organizational resources that are useful for mobilizing large number of people from across the country into dissent. Where multiple religious groups are in receipt of state favoritism this may also open the space to create inter-religious networks and organizations, useful for creating the perception that dissent is broad-based and widespread.

There are numerous examples of such inter-religious organizations playing an important role in civil resistance. The Madagascar Council of Churches, for example, played a leading role in resistance against the Radiraska regime in Madagascar from 1990-1992. Overall, we conjecture that state favoritism of religious groups creates incentives to use nonviolent tactics in rebellion, and makes it less likely that groups will use violent tactics. We also suggest that this effect applies mainly to levels of favoritism short of the fusing of religious institutions, discussed in more detail below.

H2 – Religious groups that are favored by the state are more likely to see onsets of nonviolent conflict than groups that are not favored by the government.


Religious States

High levels of inclusion might create strong dependencies with the state and extensive mobilization infrastructures that make nonviolent tactics more feasible for the reasons stated above, but these favored groups stand to lose so much from regime change that they have little incentive or motive to rebel, if the rebellion is also costly and risky, as we would assume it to be (Ginkel and Smith 1999). These are situations where states have effectively overcome the commitment problem inherent to relationships between social groups and states by fusing institutions of the government and institutions of the state. In these cases, favored religious groups have substantial and regularized control over policy-making. In some cases religious elites and state elites may substantially overlap, such as is the case in Iran. In these cases we expect that favored religious groups would rebel nonviolently if they had motives to, but the extreme level of inclusion eliminates these motives for collective dissent.

H3 – Religious groups in receipt of high levels of state favoritism are unlikely to rebel, violently or nonviolently.

Figure 1 shows our hypotheses visually by plotting the expected probabilities of violent and nonviolent across the spectrum of state exclusion to inclusion.

Figure 1 – Theoretical Expectations: State exclusion, inclusion and rebellion



Research design

Our unit of analysis is the religious group-state-year in authoritarian states. The sample of authoritarian states is bounded by cases that are not democracies in the data on Autocratic regimes from Magaloni et al (2013). Specifically, we have observations for individual religious groups of over 10,000 people in countries with over 250,000 people for each year from 1990-2013. This yields 9,382 observations for our study. We take our definition and specification of ‘religious groups’ from the World Religions Dataset (Maoz and Henderson 2013). Maoz and Henderson focus on identifying scriptures, institutions, historical evolution and “a common class of beliefs and practices” when identifying religious groups. The World Religions dataset provides 5-yearly estimates of the number of followers for 28 religious groups within states that are part of the international system from 1945-2010. We have interpolated these figures to form an annualized dataset by forward filling the data from the last known observation. Thus, the data from 1990-1994 reflect what was known about religious demographics in 1990, and the data from 1995-1999 reflect what was known

regarding religious demographics in 1995. As will become clear from the specification of our dependent variable, what we are modeling here is not the probability that the *entire* religious group will participate in violent or nonviolent insurgency (although some movements may involve substantial participation), but the probability that some members of that religious group will join a resistance campaign against the government or form a group to resist the government. Our results should *not* be interpreted to mean that the religious group in total, participated in a resistance campaign, but that a section (even a splinter) of the group did. What the study does specify is the conditions under which collective dissent is expressed within particular religious groups organizations who's actions are publicly identifiable with a religious tradition.

Dependent Variable: Participation in resistance campaigns

Our main dependent variable indicates whether a religious group participated in a violent campaign, a nonviolent campaign, or remained passive. To code this we looked for the participation of religious groups in ongoing "Major Episodes of Contention" (Chenoweth and Ulfedler 2015) for nonviolent conflicts and active dyad-years from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset for violent conflicts (Pettersen and Wallensteen 2014). Our definition of participation in general is from Chenoweth and Stephan (2011: 30) who write that participation in a resistance campaign is "active and observable engagement in collective action". As they point out, this is a strict definition and excludes providing information to resistance groups, providing food, shelter etc, biasing the measure towards more publicly observable forms of participation. We code the participation of *religious groups* when dissidents publicly claiming to represent a religious tradition participate in actions of collective dissent against the regime with goals of government or territory. For nonviolent campaigns we code participation if self-identifying religious groups participate or organize, protests, strikes or other forms of nonviolent direct action. For armed conflicts we record participation if self-identifying religious groups engage in armed attacks against the government. Thus, we are examining conflictual relations, violent and nonviolent, between the state and religious groups and not other peace-making tasks such as mediation or inter-faith dialogue that religious groups also often engage in (Vullers et al 2015). Note here that we are not identifying religious incompatibilities (see Svensson 2013) but religious participation. For example, the Government of Sudan – SPLM dyad is an example of a religious incompatibility but there is very little evidence to suggest that the SPLM claimed to

represent ‘Christians’ or that any of the composite groups of the SPLM claimed to represent the interests of Christians. On the other hand, when the Catholic Church and especially Cardinal Sin joined the protests against the Marcos regime in the Philippines this was an example of religious participation but not a religious incompatibility.

We do not require a certain number of participants from a religious group to participate in order for us to code participation. This decision was made for a number of reasons, practical and theoretical. Practically it is difficult to identify the number of participants in acts of contentious politics, let alone disaggregating this information by the type of social group (Day et al 2015). We expect that the public participation of religious leaders or traces in the historical record that religious groups were active in a resistance movement correlates with the participation of a non-trivial number of supporters. Thus, our measure should be interpreted to reflect the fact that a section of the religious tradition participated in collective action, not the entire religious group. As suggested by Day et al (2015) we have explicitly examined media and secondary sources. Our process for coding the presence of the participation of religious groups in nonviolent and violent conflict was can be found in the appendix, but, briefly, involved searches of the Factiva database if the year was after 1989, and Proquest Historical Newspapers if prior to 1989. We also relied on the Swathmore Nonviolent Action Database, the Codebook for Cunningham et al’s (2013) Non-state Actor Dataset, the UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia and U.S State Department Religious Freedom Reports. Our secondary sources included Ackerman and DuVall (2000), Sharp (2005), Roberts and Ash (2009), Nepstad (2011), Bartkowski (2013), and Toft et al (2011).

There can be new onsets even if there is ongoing participation by that group in a previous year. In this case the onset variable indicates that a new religious organization from the same religious tradition joined the campaign in this year. Note that this is uncommon for nonviolent conflicts but more common in violent conflict where there may be multiple rebel groups claiming to represent the interests of a religious tradition. Note also that while we have collected data on the dependent variable from 1960-2013, our data analysis only includes observations from 1990-2012 due to the limited availability of other data.

Independent Variables

State inclusion. Our theory leads us to expect that religious groups in receipt of preferential treatment from the state are more likely to rebel with nonviolent tactics. We have collected new, annualized data on which religious groups were favored by the state in a given year. This variable is coded based upon categorizations and definitions in Fox (2011, 2008). Specifically, we code state favoritism when a state scored “6” (Cooperative) or above on the Government Involvement in Religion (GIR) index. Scores below 6 on the GIR index indicate that the state generally did not favor specific religious groups and we have treated these groups as ‘not favored’. The GIR index does not code which group was favored by the government in that year, and these data were hand coded for each year from 1990-2013 with the following procedure. Coders were asked to read the U.S Freedom of religion reports for each country in our dataset, for each year, and identify the religious groups that were identified as receiving official government favoritism from 1999-2013. For the years 1990-1998 coders were asked to consult secondary sources, especially 'historical dictionaries' and religious histories where appropriate to ascertain whether the state favored a particular religious group. We also obtained information from “Which Countries have State Religions” by Barro and Mcleary (2005). Coders were also asked to provide information on the names of the favored religious groups. These data are available in the online appendix.

We have also created a variable that reflects the type of inclusion enjoyed by a religious group. For each group that has an inclusion score of 1 (i.e, favoured by the government) we then code the type of favoritism as identified by the GIR index. Increases from 6 (‘Cooperative’) through to 14, ‘Religious state 2’ indicate increasing enmeshment of the institutions of the state and favored religious groups. Moving up the index in general lowers the number of groups that are favored and increases the extent to which they are included in the state apparatus. Above level 9, ‘preferred religion’ there is only one favored religion. Due to a small number of cases we have folded some categories together. Levels 13 and 14 form one category for ‘religious states’, levels 9 and 10 one category for ‘preferred religion’ and levels 7 and 8 into one category for ‘multi-tiered preferences’. We use this disaggregated inclusion variable in combination with the discrimination variable (below).

Government Exclusion

Our dataset includes groups that are minorities and majorities, and there is no single data source that we are aware of that provides group disaggregated information on discrimination

or exclusion for both.⁴ We have aggregated the findings from three existing datasets that collectively code majority and minority groups as our indicator of government discrimination of religious groups. We first used the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Bormann et al 2015) to identify ethno-religious groups from 1990-2013 and then coded a '1' for discrimination if these groups were 'discriminated', 'powerless' or 'junior partners' with the government. Ethno-religious groups were identified where ethnic markers were '1', 'ethno-religious', '7', mixed, which we investigated further, and when the name of a group specifically mentioned a religious tradition in our data. We then appended this by adding '1's from the Minorities at Risk Data with the following procedure. First we selected groups that were identified as '1' or '3' in the belief variable indicating groups that were different religiously from the dominant group, either because they were from the same religion but a different sect (Sunni and Shia Islam), or from a different religious tradition (i.e Hinduism and Islam). We then assigned these cases religious group identification numbers based upon the variable 'RELIGS1 – specific religion'. We researched cases of faiths that fell into the category 'Other' and assigned these religious group identifications wherever possible. We then took the maximum score on the 'Political Discrimination Index' for each group that we could match with a religious group in our data and coded 1 if the group scored more than 3. Finally, we also coded a 1 for any cases that scored greater than the median on the political discrimination index in the Religion and State Minorities dataset (Akbaba and Fox 2011). The final variable is dichotomous indicating that a group was discriminated against by the government, or not.

In total we have two dichotomous indicators, one for state discrimination and one for state inclusion with the comparative category being 'neutral'. We also have an ordinal measure starting at discrimination, moving to neutral and then up the levels of state favoritism from 'cooperative' to 'religious states'. We use both types of variable in our analysis.

Other Variables/Control Variables.

The main alternative explanation is that small groups are more likely to engage in violent conflict and also more likely to be discriminated. Conversely, large groups are more likely to be included and also more likely to rebel nonviolently (Dahl et al 2015). We control for the size of the religious groups using the WRD measure of the number of followers of a given

4

religious group, divided by the entire population from the World Bank Databank (2016). We have divided over the entire population (rather than the religious population) because dissidents are more likely to calculate their mobilization potential in relation to society as a whole, rather than just within the various religious communities. We also include a country-year measure of democratic institutions from the Polity IV project (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2014). As Grim and Finke (2006) point out, religious freedoms and regulations tend to be bundled with restrictions on other freedoms, and are also closely related to the onset of violent and nonviolent conflict (Butcher and Svensson 2016). Second, we include controls for the state level infant mortality rate, logged and lagged by 1 year and the logged population in the country in that year. We also include a squared population term as this was associated with the presence of state religions in Barro and McLeary (2005). These data are from the World Bank Databank (2016). To control out country level variation we also used fixed effects estimators, discussed in more detail below.

In other models reported below we also include a cubic polynomial of years since the last time the religious group participated in violent conflict and a separate polynomial for the years since the religious group participated in a nonviolent conflict (Carter and Signorino 2010). The number of other religious groups participating in violent conflict locally (i.e. within the boundaries of the state), and again, separately the number of other religious groups participating in nonviolent conflict locally was included to estimate the impact of diffusion across religious groups/and/or the possibility that religious conflicts polarize religious groups.⁵ We also include a variable measuring Religious Freedom from the CIRI Human Rights Dataset (Cingranelli and Richards 2010) to control for the possibility that it is state-level rather than group level religious freedoms that create the space for nonviolent conflicts. Finally, we include variables measuring the number of religious groups globally that were rebelling violently and separately for nonviolently to control for global waves of religious protest.⁶ With the exception of the religious freedom variable these data were constructed from our measures of religious participation in violent and nonviolent conflict.

Data Analysis

We used a combination of descriptive, bivariate and multivariate analysis, but due to space constraints only the multivariate analyses are shown below. Descriptive and bivariate analyses

⁵ See fn. 5

⁶ Not including rebellion by group i if there was an onset in that year.

can be found in the appendix. Three outcomes are modeled in the multivariate analysis: (1) no major challenge to the regime by the religious group in question, (2) the onset of a violent resistance campaign, or (3) the onset of a nonviolent resistance campaign. Multinomial logit analysis was used to model the likelihood of these outcomes occurring independently (Greene 2011: 803). How the multinomial logit models proceed is explained in more detail in the section below.

Results

Multivariate analysis

Table 1 shows the results of multinomial regression analysis with the reference category as ‘no onset’ and ‘1’ representing the onset of violent conflict and 2 the onset of nonviolent conflict. Table 1 shows four models (in order). Model 1 is a baseline model including only the favouritism and discrimination variables along with controls for population (and its square), the infant mortality rate (logged and 1 year lagged), and the polity score (1 year lagged). Model 2 adds country fixed effects, Model 3 adds a host of additional controls including country-level religious freedoms, the number of other religious groups in rebellion locally and globally, and a control for the participation of that religious group in rebellion in the previous year. Model 4 restricts the sample to years of ongoing MEC conflicts or UCDP internal armed conflicts.

Table 1 suggests support for our main hypotheses. We see a consistent and positive effect of state favouritism on the probability of religious participation in nonviolent conflict, but not violent conflict and a significant, positive relationship between state discrimination and violent conflict but not nonviolent conflict. Thus, positive connections between the state and religious groups tend to be associated with those groups using nonviolent tactics, while negative relationships between the state and religious groups tend to be associated with the use of violent tactics in rebellion. To obtain a more intuitive sense of what the results mean, Figure 4 plots how changing from a neutral to a discriminated group, and then a neutral to a favoured group changes the probability of violent and nonviolent rebellion. The scenario simulated here is for a large group (50% of the population) in a poor, authoritarian state

Figure 2 – Simulated first differences in the probability of violent and nonviolent rebellion (Model 1, Table 1).




Figure 2 suggests that both favouritism and discrimination are associated with contention in general, as in both cases the probability of ‘no rebellion’ drops significantly when compared to religious groups with neutral relations with the state. Discrimination increases the probability of violent contention, but does not appear to change the probability of nonviolent contention. State favouritism appears to increase the probability of nonviolent forms of contention emerging, and there is a negative although not ‘statistically significant’ effect of inclusion on violent conflict. Abstractly, this suggests, as previous research has started to establish, that violent and nonviolent tactics are not readily substitutable. Discrimination may do little to further reduce the efficacy of a group that already has little capability in nonviolent conflict, especially if governments target weak groups with discrimination. However, for groups with a pre-existing capability for violent conflict, state exclusion might create the grievances and a narrative around which the group can mobilize with its preferred tactical choice. Similarly, favouritism might add capabilities to groups with existing capabilities in

nonviolent conflict, but may add little to groups whose tactical profile is better suited to violent tactics.


A number of additional results are worth mentioning. Group size has a consistently positive effect on the probability of violent groups emerging from within a religious tradition, but a less certain effect on the probability of nonviolent groups emerging. This is a less trivial finding than it may initially appear to be, as it does suggest that the onset of nonviolent forms of conflict in authoritarian states may be more strongly influenced by variables that tie social groups to the state and to each other (i.e. variables that reflect the overlap of social networks between the state and dissident groups, or dependency relationships) than by pure numerical mobilization potential. Of course, group size is still important, as it underpins which groups are favoured and which are not (see Table 3), but institutional connections between groups and the state appear to be at least as important, at least with respect to religious groups. It is also important that both the findings as they relate to inclusion and discrimination hold with country-fixed effects. This suggests that when comparing groups within the same country, those that are favoured by the state tend to rebel nonviolently, while those that are discriminated against see violent groups emerging more frequently. We also see local and global diffusion across religious groups for nonviolent forms of contention, but only global diffusion for violent forms. As can be found in the appendix, nonviolent forms of conflict tend to see more cooperative behaviour across religious groups – the more other groups that are participating in nonviolent contention, the more likely group *i* is to participate. Note that we don't see diffusion across tactics either. The number of religious groups engaging in nonviolent dissent does not influence whether group *i* engages in violent dissent, and vice versa. Finally, we also see that these results remain when we restrict the sample only to country-years with some ongoing 'major episode of contention' or internal armed conflict. That is, when there is a rebellion ongoing in a given country those groups that are favoured by the state tend to rebel nonviolently, while those that are discriminated against tend to rebel violently.⁷

How does the probability of violent and nonviolent rebellion vary across the spectrum of state discrimination and inclusion? While we have found initial evidence for H1 and H2, is there evidence to suggest that high levels of state favouritism have lower levels of rebellion in

⁷ This also holds if we use logit models only on the sample of major episodes of contention and internal armed conflicts respectively.

general (H3)? One way to test our expectations of a non-linear relationship is to include the spectrum of discrimination/inclusion as an ordinal variable with a squared term to allow the relationship to take on a parabolic form. Recall that increasing values reflect the movement from discrimination to neutrality, then up the scale of state inclusion. We also tested a cubic polynomial to assess whether this functional form fit the data better and to allow for any upward trend towards the end of the distribution. Table 2 shows the results of including these variables in the baseline models (Table 1, Model 1). Figure 3 shows the simulated probability of violent and nonviolent rebellion when we include the quadratic form (left hand panel) and the cubic polynomial (right hand panel).

Figure 3 – Simulated Probability of Violent and Nonviolent Rebellion, Religious Groups, Table 3, Model 1.



The results from Table 2, Model 1 suggest that there is a parabolic relationship between state favouritism and nonviolent conflict. The probability of participation in a nonviolent campaign is very low for discriminated religious groups and increases as these groups become favoured by the state. This hits a peak, and the probability of rebellion declines for these most favoured groups. When we fit the cubic polynomial the results suggest that the probability of

nonviolent contention actually flattens off at the highest levels of favouritism. The model with the cubic polynomial actually fits the data slightly better after a log-likelihood test. An important consequence of both of these figures is that because the probability of violent rebellion is not increasing at the same rate as the probability of nonviolent conflict is decreasing, the likelihood of no rebellion is also increasing. That is, at the extremes, we are seeing less rebellion in general than towards the middle of the scale, or, potentially, for discriminated groups. Generally speaking, for both the quadratic and cubic polynomial functions, discriminated groups have low probabilities of nonviolent rebellion and significantly higher probabilities of violent rebellion. The likelihood of violent rebellion drops sharply as religious groups have neutral or moderately favoured relations with the state. Returning to Figure 1, which was our predicted relationship between the probability of violent and nonviolent rebellion across the spectrum of inclusion and discrimination, our hypotheses find some support in the data.

Extensions and robustness tests

We conducted other robustness tests that can be found in the appendix which including binomial logit models for violent and nonviolent rebellion separately rather than multinomial logit models and mixed effects models with random coefficients for countries. The results are very similar to those reported here. We also ran tests on the sample of democracies, and found that while there was a generally positive relationship between inclusion and nonviolent conflict, and a strong general positive relationship between discrimination and violent conflict, our expectations regarding a parabolic relationship were not upheld. In fact, the parabolic relationship was flipped, with higher rates of violent conflict being observed at both extremes, by *favoured* groups in religious states (such as in Pakistan) and discriminated groups (such as in the Philippines).

Clearly state inclusion is not randomly distributed. One concern may be that our results reflect reverse causality, with the propensity for rebellion driving levels of state favoritism and biasing our coefficients. There are a number of reasons why we think this may not be a substantial issue. First, we have run Lagrange multiplier score tests for the presence of endogeneity between the onset of nonviolent conflict and state favoritism using recursive bivariate probit models and we found weak evidence of endogeneity for state favoritism and religious participation in nonviolent conflict, but not for violent conflict (for a similar

application see Kim and Magaloni 2010, Marra 2016).⁸ The results of these recursive bivariate probit models can be found in Table 3. Note that for these models we added state inclusion/discrimination at t-1 in the equation to predict inclusion/discrimination, but not in the equation to predict the onset of religious participation in nonviolent conflict.⁹ We acknowledge that we do not have a plausible instrument for state-inclusion at this stage, so the results should be treated with caution. However, we do see that the results are in line with those reported earlier. While group size is a positively and significantly correlated with state inclusion it is not strongly related to the onset of participation in nonviolent conflict, while inclusion is positively and significantly related to participation in nonviolent conflict. Group size is not a strong predictor of discrimination, but discrimination and group size are positively correlated with participation in violent conflict.¹⁰ Only in the cases of participation in nonviolent conflict with endogenous inclusion and discrimination variables is the theta term (the same as the rho parameter in other bivariate probit models) close to statistical significance, indicating in both cases that our estimates were biased up.

Second, we have controlled for factors thought to influence why state religions form in the first place (Barro and McLearly 2005) and, to the extent that the size of the group is a reasonable proxy for potential in mass mobilization, then we have also controlled for this. That is, we are looking at the effect of state favouritism (and discrimination) independent of the size of the group, and the characteristics of the country that may make the formation of a state religion more or less likely. Finally, it's not clear why this endogeneity issue would *only* apply to nonviolent tactics, and if it were driving the results then we should see a similar positive relationship between favouritism and violent conflict. Finally, it is also not clear how this concern would bias our nonlinear hypothesis where groups in receipt of mid-range levels of state favouritism are the most likely to rebel non-violently.

Concluding discussion

⁸ The p-values for these tests were 0.086 for nonviolent conflict onsets and 0.982 for violent conflict onsets.

⁹ It has a negative and statistically insignificant effect on the onset of religious participation in nonviolent and violent conflict if we do include it.

¹⁰ Recursive models with one probit link and one continuous link can be run in the SemiParBIVProbit package (Marra 2016). We ran these models to re-test our non-linear hypotheses, and, although the results were largely the same as those reported with the single equations in Table 1 and 2, the models did not properly converge so we do not report them.

In this paper we have argued that state discrimination of religious groups increases the incentives for the use of violent tactics, while state inclusion can actually empower groups to use nonviolent tactics in rebellion. When favoritism becomes extreme, however, we have argued that the incentives for rebellion in general decline. We find some support for these ideas in our data. Discrimination is the institutional configuration that appears to be most closely connected to violent conflict, keeping in mind that our results also suggest consistently that it is the largest groups that see violent organizations emerging, claiming to represent them. Moderate levels of state inclusion are correlated with the onset of religious participation in authoritarian states, but this effect declines (or flattens off) when the institutions of the state and religious groups become more closely fused.

Thus study contributes to the growing literature on the onset of nonviolent campaigns. In line with much previous research we find that extensive and overlapping social networks at the group level appear to enable the use of nonviolent tactics, along with the overlap of the social networks of dissenters and agents of the state (Thurber 2012; Butcher and Svensson 2016). The value-added of this study is that we were able to directly measure the overlap between state and group-level networks. Our study also points to countervailing effects for some of the processes that drive the onset of nonviolent rebellion. Factors that tend to increase the mobilization potential or civilians also, on average, probably tend to increase satisfaction in the status quo. Without accounting for these countervailing effects what appears as a null relationship may actually be concealing two processes, one of which increases the probability that rebellions will manifest as civil resistance, and the other reducing the probability of rebellion in general. Other variables potentially linked to the onset of nonviolent rebellion plausibly possess this feature such as modernization and globalization (Karakaya 2016). More generally, we see our study as providing support for some of the mechanisms proposed in Philpott (2007) and Toft et al (2011). Religious groups, in autocratic states, appear to play ‘constructive’ roles when they have both institutional autonomy and institutional overlap with the state, in addition to connections with other religious groups vis a vis their connections to the state. This might be thought of as closest to their category of ‘consensual differentiation’ and sharing similarities in some cases with conflictual differentiation, both of which they associate with preferences for democracy.

Our results have a number of other important implications. Nonviolent uprisings both represent an important manifestation of social capital, as well as help to create and form it (Karatnycky & Ackerman 2005). Therefore this research also has wider implications for broader fields of research, including on the research on the role of the state and political institutions in the creation of social capital in societies riven by social conflicts. Whether state support of religion through privileges, funding and regulations, foster or erode social capital among the religious groups that are recipients of such state favoritism has received relatively little attention in previous research (Traunmüller and Freitag). In our study, we show that the difference in degree of religious-state relationships affects the propensity for religious groups to rebel nonviolently. It is therefore important to take into account the institutional set-up of states in order to understand the groups' decision to withdraw their consent and challenge regimes.

There are a number of limitations to our study. We cannot differentiate between the causal mechanisms that we have proposed, although further case based research may assist in this regard. It also remains possible that there are factors correlated with which groups are favored by the state, and in what configurations, and the onset of nonviolent conflicts. It also remains possible that our results reflect endogeneity between nonviolent conflict and higher levels of state inclusion that we have not been able to statistically differentiate from our main effects here. While we interpret our results cautiously, our study shows that it is analytically fruitful to examine the various institutional incentives for social groups on the sub-state level for mobilization against the state. Disentangling the different relationships that groups have to state can help us to better understand the group milieu in which rebellion occur, and in particular, the conditions under which groups self-identifying with various religious traditions choose to take up arms or banners.

Table 1 - Regression Results, State Favouritism and Rebellion by Religious Groups

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept):(Violent)	-53.01 [*] (22.79)	-114.28 (5781.88)	-31.52 (25.75)	-6.98 (25.68)
(Intercept):(Nonviolent)	-12.02 (13.98)	-595.92 (5920.53)	-14.67 (20.69)	23.33 (17.10)
Favoured group:(Violent)	-0.66 (0.44)	-0.40 (0.78)	-0.46 (0.53)	-0.77 (0.48)
Favoured group:(Nonviolent)	2.74 ^{***} (0.50)	3.05 ^{**} (1.11)	2.50 ^{***} (0.55)	3.02 ^{***} (0.52)
Discriminated group:(Violent)	1.53 ^{***} (0.42)	1.39 [*] (0.58)	1.20 [*] (0.48)	1.48 ^{***} (0.44)
Discriminated group:(Nonviolent)	0.41 (0.47)	0.94 (0.71)	0.56 (0.57)	0.26 (0.49)
Group Size (%):(Violent)	4.80 ^{***} (0.66)	3.93 ^{***} (0.91)	2.46 ^{**} (0.84)	4.69 ^{***} (0.70)
Group Size (%):(Nonviolent)	0.93 (0.57)	1.58 (1.53)	1.77 [*] (0.77)	0.34 (0.61)
Population (log):(Violent)	4.72 (2.68)	6.50 (23.06)	2.43 (3.01)	0.08 (3.08)
Population (log):(Nonviolent)	0.15 (1.71)	74.07 [*] (36.05)	0.43 (2.55)	-3.18 (2.11)
Population (log).sq:(Violent)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.70)	-0.06 (0.09)	-0.00 (0.09)
Population (log).sq:(Nonviolent)	0.00 (0.05)	-2.36 [*] (1.14)	-0.02 (0.08)	0.09 (0.06)
Polity score (t-1):(Violent)	0.04 (0.04)	0.14 (0.07)	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.04)
Polity score (t-1):(Nonviolent)	-0.11 [*] (0.05)	-0.53 ^{**} (0.17)	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.15 ^{**} (0.05)
ln Infant Mortality (t-1):(Violent)	0.53 (0.29)	2.96 (1.66)	0.76 [*] (0.39)	0.04 (0.32)
ln Infant Mortality (t-1):(Nonviolent)	0.37 (0.26)	-6.87 ^{**} (2.43)	0.57 (0.35)	-0.36 (0.26)
Religious freedoms (t-1):(Violent)			-0.47 (0.34)	
Religious freedoms (t-1):(Nonviolent)			-0.08 (0.27)	
NV participating rel. grps. :(Violent)			-0.49 (1.05)	
NV participating rel. grps. :(Nonviolent)			1.45 ^{***} (0.22)	
V participating rel. grps. :(Violent)			-0.78 (1.06)	
V participating rel. grps. :(Nonviolent)			-16.54 (2399.89)	
NV participating rel. grps. .global:(Violent)			-0.05 (0.16)	
NV participating rel. grps. .global:(Nonviolent)			0.40 ^{***} (0.09)	
V participating rel. grps. .global:(Violent)			0.17 ^{**} (0.05)	
V participating rel. grps. .global:(Nonviolent)			-0.01	

Participation (t-1):(Violent)			(0.05)	
			-17.40	
			(5508.93)	
Participation (t-1):(Nonviolent)			2.39	
			(2.11)	
Violent participation (t-1):(Violent)			-1.22	
			(0.81)	
Violent participation (t-1):(Nonviolent)			-0.70	
			(1.52)	
<hr/>				
Log Likelihood	-370.69	-258.88	-284.82	-295.47
Deviance	741.38	517.76	569.63	590.95
Num. obs.	9382	9382	9382	2927
<hr/>				

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Table 2 - Regression Results, Quadratic Relationship: Rebellion by Religious Groups

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
(Intercept):(Violent)	-57.39*	-125.97	-35.93	-9.35
	(23.56)	(5706.13)	(25.79)	(26.78)
(Intercept):(Nonviolent)	-15.75	-625.35	-12.86	19.47
	(12.68)	(5892.13)	(19.12)	(15.67)
Discrim/Fav Ordinal:(Violent)	-0.87	-1.26	-0.37	-1.04*
	(0.46)	(0.73)	(0.57)	(0.45)
Discrim/Fav Ordinal:(Nonviolent)	2.35***	0.45	2.33***	2.32***
	(0.56)	(1.55)	(0.63)	(0.61)
Discrim/Fav Ordinal ² :(Violent)	0.08	0.13	0.03	0.09*
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Discrim/Fav Ordinal ² :(Nonviolent)	-0.21***	0.09	-0.18**	-0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Group Size (%):(Violent)	4.73***	4.43***	2.23**	4.67***
	(0.65)	(0.96)	(0.86)	(0.69)
Group Size (%):(Nonviolent)	0.42	1.23	0.40	-0.12
	(0.71)	(1.55)	(0.87)	(0.82)
Population (log):(Violent)	5.41*	8.07	3.05	0.59
	(2.75)	(22.90)	(2.99)	(3.18)
Population (log):(Nonviolent)	0.17	78.30*	-0.46	-3.16
	(1.55)	(36.74)	(2.38)	(1.95)
Population (log) ² :(Violent)	-0.14	-0.13	-0.08	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.70)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Population (log) ² :(Nonviolent)	0.00	-2.51*	0.01	0.09
	(0.05)	(1.17)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Polity score (t-1):(Violent)	0.02	0.14*	0.04	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Polity score (t-1):(Nonviolent)	-0.12**	-0.54***	-0.11*	-0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.05)
ln Infant Mortality (t-1):(Violent)	0.46	3.04	0.68	-0.08
	(0.28)	(1.67)	(0.38)	(0.31)
ln Infant Mortality (t-1):(Nonviolent)	0.41	-7.24**	0.74	-0.25
	(0.27)	(2.50)	(0.38)	(0.27)
Religious freedoms (t-1):(Violent)			-0.47	
			(0.34)	
Religious freedoms (t-1):(Nonviolent)			-0.05	
			(0.28)	
NV participating rel. grps. :(Violent)			-0.74	
			(1.15)	
NV participating rel. grps. :(Nonviolent)			1.56***	
			(0.21)	
V participating rel. grps. :(Violent)			-1.06	
			(1.07)	
V participating rel. grps. :(Nonviolent)			-16.59	
			(2450.72)	
NV participating rel. grps. .global:(Violent)			-0.07	
			(0.16)	
NV participating rel. grps. .global:(Nonviolent)			0.44***	
			(0.09)	
V participating rel. grps. .global:(Violent)			0.18**	

V participating rel. grps. .global:(Nonviolent)			(0.05)	
			-0.00	
Nonviolent participation (t-1):(Violent)			(0.05)	
			-17.48	
Nonviolent participation (t-1):(Nonviolent)			(5349.20)	
			2.71	
Violent participation (t-1):(Violent)			(2.11)	
			-1.15	
Violent participation (t-1):(Nonviolent)			(0.82)	
			-0.89	
			(1.58)	
Log Likelihood	-380.77	-262.38	-287.84	-306.56
Deviance	761.55	524.76	575.68	613.12
Num. obs.	9382	9382	9382	2927

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Table 3 - Recursive Bivariate Regression Results

	Onset(NV), Endog(Fav)	Onset(NV), Endog(Dis)	Onset(V), Endog(Fav)	Onset(V), Endog(Dis)
Equation 1: State Favoritism/Discrimination				
(Intercept)	-3.38 (3.52)	-1.72 (3.24)	-3.38 (3.52)	-1.79 (3.24)
Included (t-1)	5.93*** (0.34)		5.93*** (0.34)	
Discriminated.lag.1		4.27*** (0.10)		4.28*** (0.10)
Discriminated	0.04 (0.15)		0.05 (0.15)	
Included		0.05 (0.13)		0.05 (0.13)
Group Size (%)	1.63*** (0.17)	0.10 (0.23)	1.62*** (0.17)	0.09 (0.23)
ln Population (t-1)	-0.08 (0.43)	-0.15 (0.39)	-0.08 (0.43)	-0.15 (0.39)
ln Population ² (t-1).	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Polity score (t-1)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.10*** (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
ln Infant Mortality (t-1)	0.29*** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.29*** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)
Equation 2: Onset of Rel. Part. In Violent/Nonviolent Conflict				
(Intercept)	-3.14 (4.82)	-3.37 (4.80)	-18.33* (7.44)	-18.27* (7.43)
Included	0.82*** (0.18)	0.89*** (0.16)	-0.26 (0.19)	-0.26 (0.18)
Discriminated	0.16 (0.19)	-0.02 (0.23)	0.60*** (0.17)	0.61*** (0.17)
Group Size (%)	0.44 (0.23)	0.40 (0.22)	1.80*** (0.27)	1.80*** (0.27)
ln Population (t-1)	-0.14 (0.59)	-0.12 (0.59)	1.51 (0.87)	1.50 (0.87)
ln Population ² (t-1)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Polity score (t-1)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
ln Infant Mortality (t-1)	0.14 (0.10)	0.13 (0.10)	0.19 (0.11)	0.19 (0.11)
Theta	0.23	0.42	0.01	-0.06
CI Theta h	-0.01	0.02	-0.46	-0.37
CI Theta l	0.47	0.73	0.44	0.28
Num. obs.	8393	8393	8393	8393

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

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